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The Politics of Embryonic Discourse

KEVIN P. QUINN, S.J:

In our brave new world of stem cells, clones, and parthenotes,l how
In fashioning a response to

should we talk about early human embryos?

this very thorny question, Ann Kiessling has a core message.2 It is:
new science produces "new" conceptuses;3

(2)

(1)

that

that science and scientists

have failed to differentiate (with appropriate clarity) these new ex vivo

4 (3) that new, more appropriate and

conceptuses from those created in vivo;

scientifically-informed, terms are necessary;S and (4) that this new lan
guage should transform the public discourse about human embryos.6 No
one would deny that the subtleties of human embryology are neglected in
public debate. This alone should compel scientists to choose terms that
make scientific sense and to provide clear definitions. Dr. Kiessling has
accepted well that challenge. But I also think that Kiessling is up to some
thing else in her essay. She is attempting to reposition science, to gain for
it a more influential voice in the heated politics of embryonic discourse. It
is this point of concern that I shall address.
For much of contemporary jurisprudence, "[i]t is the fashion now to
claim that all is politics, and that every frame of thought is an ideology.
From this claim it follows that theory and practice are nearly indistinguish-

•

Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.

I

In February 2004, South Korean scientists reported that they had made the world's first cloned

human embryos, and had extracted stem cells from one of them. See Gina Kolata, Cloning Creates
Human Embryos: South Koreans Say Stem Cells Were Extracted, N.Y. TiMEs, Feb. 12, 2004, at AI;
see also Stephen S. Hall, Specter o/ Cloning May Prove a Mirage, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2004, at F l
(considering whether a normal human blastocyst is the same as a cloned one).

2 Ann A. Kiessling, What Is an Embryo?, 36 CONN. L. REv. 1051 (2004).
3 Id. at 105l. This notion is from Janet L. Dolgin, Embryonic Discourse: Abortion,

Stem Cel/s,

and Cloning, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 101, lSI (2003).

4

Kiessling, supra note 2, at 1053-54. Kiessling also laments the scientific community's missed

opportunities to differentiate-so that legislators and courts might better understand-the nature, char
acter, and potential of a human embryo as it develops through various stages in vivo. Id.
S
Id.
6 Id.

1163
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,
able, since every theoretical proposition is also a political ploy. ,7

Under

the pretext of presenting a masterful primer on human embryology and
assisted reproduction to a nonscientific audience, Kiessling is making a
hidden grasp for political advantage.

Her strategy is a well-tested one.s

First, concede that the human embryo has "symbolic" value for many,9 but
insist that its moral or ontological status is not in question here. Do not try
to answer the hard question: when does life begin?

Leave that to non

empirical disciplines such as philosophy and theology.

Instead, pose in

nocuously that science can help the public debate by combating the "im
precise")O use of the tenn embryo. Then, strategically redefine the embryo
in "nature's view..11 to exclude its earliest developmental stages prior to
implantation, either in vivo or � vivo, and the living entities resulting from
nuclear transplant technology or parthenogenesis. Finally, having tight
,,
ened society's "vastly more generous )2 view of the embryo, argue that
"cleaving eggs [eggs activated with or without sperm] are not [yet] em
,,
bryos )3 and so neutralize the super-heated debate about the embryo's
status in the case for stem cell research and cloning-for-biomedical
research.
Once enlightened in this fashion, our moral squeamishness about sacri
ficing embryos to advance science should diminish for, as scientist Ki
essling informs us, to harvest stem cells requires destroying only cleaving
human eggs or ovasomes and not symbolically more valuable human em
bryos. The adverb only is important here. While Kiessling concedes that a
new public debate on the ethics of cleaving egg research is inevitable, she
is tacitly confident that, with a politically active scientific community now
encouraged to inform policymakers "of the naturally limited developmental
potential of each early conceptus,")· societal approval permitting and fund7 Eva T.H. Brann, EighJ Theses on Liberal Education. at http://arachnid.pepperdine.edul
goseweb/OBQuarterly/winteJOOlbrann.html (last visited Apr. S, 20(4) (on file with the Connecticut
Law Review).
8 See, e.g., Jane Maienschein, What's in a Name: Embryos. Clones and Stem Cells. 2 AM. J. Blc)'
ETHICS 12 (2002) (arguing that it is vitally important to define the term "embryo" clearly and carefully
to aid legislative debate on stem cell research).
9 For the meaning of, and debate on, the "symbolic" value of human embryos, see Kevin P.
Quinn, Embryonic Stem Cell Research as an Ethical Issue: On the Emptiness o/Symbolic Value, 13 ST.
THOMAS L. REv. 8S1 (2001).
0
1 Kiessling states:
It may be futile to attempt to replace "embryo" with another more accurate tenn with
respect to human eggs fertilized by sperm. The hope in this regard is to educate the
public that a cleaving egg is not the same stage of "embryo" as an "embryo" two
weeks following implantation in the uterus.
Kiessling, supra note 2, at 1089.
11 ld. at 1064.
121d.
131d. at 1087.
14 1d. at 1088.
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ing e mbryonic stem cell research, including publicly funded destruction of
cleaving eggs and ovasomes, will come.

IS

What is troubling about Kiessling's argument? It adopts an attitude of
professional paternalism. 16

One can brief her argument in this way: Let

professional human embryologists, who "have largely resisted worrying
about definitions not deemed scientifically important,"" now present to
courts and legislators the events and processes of human development in
transparently clear language, and the masses will not be able to resist the
captivating authority of science.

Listen to science-as it devalues the

status of early embryos in promoting "embryos-as-salvation for individual,
sick children and disabled heroes"18-for its argument in support of stern
cell research should be a no-brainer! 19
This policy perspective is clearly wrong. The President's COWlcil on
Bioethics ("PCB") is helpful here. It endorses the position that
biological findings, however relevant, are not themselves
necessarily decisive morally

.

. .. A description of early em

bryonic development is necessary though not sufficient to an
understanding of the nature and worth of an early embryo. It
is not sufficient because any purely biological description re
quires some interpretation of its anthropological and moral
significance before it can function as a guide to action.20
I read Kiessling to intimate that her biological findings-themselves
not controversial21-have greater policy value than the PCB or I am willing
to grant. Kiessling's findings are necessary, though not sufficient, to hold
firm in advocating for more extensive research on embryonic stem cells.
Something more is needed.
Invoking the scientific reality of early human development does not, in
itself, illuminate the choices to be made about early embryos.

Yet good

science must challenge policies fOWlded on erroneous assumptions about
the nature, character, and moral standing of human embryos.

And Ki

essling is using good biological evidence to make her case for three termi
nological choices: For human eggs fertilized with sperm, implantation is "a
IS

Id, at 1 092,

16 I acknowledge that my critique may also suggest professional insecurity, I am not a scientist.
"
18
19

Maienschcin, supra note 8, at 12,
Dolgin, supra note 3, at 158,

See Kiessling, supra note 2, at 1 092 (arguing that U[w]e have the opportunity to potentially
treat incurable diseases estimated to arnict half of all Americans"),
20 PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, MONITORING STEM CELL REsEARCH 75 (Jan, 2004),
available at www,bioethics,gov/reports/stemcell/ (last visited Mar, 31, 2004) (on file with the Con
necticut Law Review) [hereinafter PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL].
21 Compare id, at 157-81 (notes on early human development), with Kiessling, supra note 2, at
Part V,
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,,
more accurate requirement for embryo status; 22 following that definition,
,,
nuclear transplants and parthenotes should not be called "embryos. 23 I
shall comment on each.
Kiessling's biology of reproduction matches the dominant view
man embryology that "there is no such

in

hu

thing as 'the embryo.",24 Rather, it

is "a reified name for a dynamic entity [in an early phase of its develop
,,
ment]. 25 More importantly, Kiessling makes the case for meaningful dis
continuity26 between the blastula and gastrula stages (of a developing fertil
ized egg).

She asserts that a preimplantation blastula is not an "embryo,"

based on the high rate of activated egg loss during the first few days after
fertilization.27

Still, other scientists urge caution in the use of statistics

about early embryo loss.28

By definition, a preimplantation blastula is different from an implanted
and differentiated gastrula. But is it not "alive" or not an "individual" in
the same way the gastrula is?29 Not simply grounded in biology, this ques
tion appeals also to a moral or even metaphysical claim about the meaning
of human life. To be sure, observations on the meaning of potentiality and
the tools of philosophical and theological anthropology continue to inform
the stem cell debate.30 For instance, certain liberal Catholics (among oth
ers)
do not consider the human embryo in its earliest states (prior
to the development of the primitive streak or to implantation)
to constitute an individualized human entity with the settled
inherent potential to become a human person.
status of the embryo is, therefore

(in

The moral

this view), not that of a

person, and its use for certain kinds of research can be justi-

22 Kiessling, supra note 2, at 1089.
23 [d. at 1091-92.
24 PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL, supra note 20, at 12; see Kiessling, supra note 2, at 1092 (stating

that

"[u]nless they are transferred to a Utenls, they will not, in any event, become human embryos.").

25 PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL, supra note 20, at 12 n.·.
6 On
the importance of biological continuity or discontinuity
2

in early human development, see

PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL, supra note 20, at 76-84.
27 See Kiessling, supra note 2, at 1064 n.33, Part C. Kiessling underscores natural failure in hu
man reproduction: 'The magnitude of the task of a single egg to engender a new individual is, of itself,
the reason it fails far more often than it succeeds. Failure can occur at many stages." [d. at 1056.

28

See, e.g., Kevin T. Fitzgerald, Human Embryonic Stem Cell Research: Ethics in the Face of

Uncenainty, in GoD AND THE EMBRYO: RELIGIOUS VOICES ON STEM CELLS AND CLONING 131, 134-

39 (Brent Walters & Ronald Cole-Turner eds., 2003).

29 See Maienschein, supra note 8, at IS.
30 See, e.g., Gene Outka, The Ethics of Stem Cell

Research, in GOD AND THE EMBRYO, supra note
28, at 29. See generally 3 NAT'L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM'N, ETHICAL ISSUES IN HUMAN STEM
CELL RESEARCH: RELIGIOUS PERSPECTIVES (June 2000) (chronicling a variety of religious views on
stem cell research) [hereinafter NBAC REPORT]
.
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fied.31
While many observers would judge this approach very useful, I worry that
it may reflect "a society often ready to define embryos instrumentally but
anxious at the same time to mask that fact from itself. ,,32
Should we distinguish "the constructed embryo

.

. . from the embryo

produced sexually,,?33 Since a nuclear transplant (or ovasome) is con
structed by means of somatic cell nuclear transfer or similar technologies
and not produced from the union of gametes, it seems appropriate to cham
pion a new term in order to distinguish two organisms that differ as to ori
gin. The danger here is to ignore the biological reality that both organisms
share the same human genome and so then to treat them differently. Ki
essling falls into that trap as she explains "strictly speaking," nuclear trans
plants "would only become embryos in the classical sense if they are trans
ferred to the uterus and initiate implantation. At this stage they could right
fully be termed 'embryos' ."34

She states further that "somatic-cell

ovaplast-constructs undergo cleavage and development to the blastocyst
state morphologically similar to zygotes and parthenotes which is the state
,
at which pluripotent stem cells could be isolated.,,35 Finally, "[s]ince the
derivation of pluripotent stem cells will be the goal for human somatic31

Margaret A. Farley, Roman Catholic Views on Research Involving Human Embryonic Stem

Cells, in NBAC REPORT, supra note 30, at D-4 (testimony of Dr. Margaret A. Farley,Yale University).
For a similar discussion on the embryo's status as a person, see also Lisa Sowle Cahill, The Embryo
and the Fetus: New Moral Contexts, 54 THEOLOGICAL STUD. 124 (1993); Richard A. McCormick, Who
or What is the Preembryo?, I KENNEDY iNST. ETHICS 1. I (1991); Thomas A. Shannon, Human Em
bryonic Stem Cell Therapy, 62 THEOLOGICAL STUD. 811 (2001); Thomas A. Shannon & A. B. Walter,
Reflections on the Moral Status a/the Pre-Embryo, 51 THEOLOGICAL STUD. 603 (1990). To make their
case, these authors highlight the biology of twinning. See, e.g., Cahill, supra, at 127-28; McCormick,
supra, at 8-12.

For a discussion on twinning, see PRESIDENT'S COl'NCI L, supra note 20, at 79-80.

Contrast with Pontifical Academy for Life, Declaration on the Production and the Scientific and
Therapeutic Use 0/ Human Embryonic Stem Cells, in Goo AND THE EMBRYO, supra note 28, at 163,
167 (''On the basis of a complete biological analysis, the living human embryo is-from the moment of
the union of the gametes-a human subject with a welI defined identity . . .. From this it follows that
as a 'human individual' it has a right to its own life. "); Edmund D. Pellegrino, Testimony, in NBAC
REPORT, supra note 30, at F-3 ("In the Roman Catholic view, human life is a continuum from the one

celI stage to death. At every stage, human life has dignity and merits protection. Upon conception, the
biological and ontological individuality of a human being is established."). For an argument against the
possibility of twinning as a marker, see Robert P. George (joined by Alfonso G6mez-Lobo), Personal
Statement, in THE PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY 294,
301-05 (2002), available at http://www.bioethics.gov/reportslcloningreport!pcbe_cloninlLreport.pdf

(last visited Mar. 25,2004) (on file with the Connecticut Law Review).
Notably, the 1990 British Parliament, in sanctioning some embryo research, agreed that preim
plantation blastulas "have not progressed to the point that they can be considered individuals." Maien
schein, supra note 8, at 14 (quoting The Meaning a/Life, 412 NATURE 255 (2001».

32 Dolgin,supra note 3,at 156.
33 1d. at 153.
34 Kiessling,supra note 2, at 1091.
351d.
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cell-ovaplast-constructs, they will never achieve 'embryo' statuS."36
Early embryos and nuclear transplants share the same biological and
ontological status and so should be treated similarly-with equal respect. I
part company with the canons of postrnodernism to put the matter this way:
early embryos and nuclear transplants deserve respect "in virtue of the kind
of entity they are,,37 and any instrumentalist reason for their existence is
immaterial. 38
Parthenogenesis, from the Greek word for "virgin birth," is the devel
opment of a new organism-genetically identical to the mother-from an
egg without fertilization by sperm, whether or not the resulting organism
develops eventually into an adult. Some scientists suggest that the parthe
nogenetic organism or "parthenote" may represent an ethically acceptable
alternative source of embryonic stem cells without the need to harm normal
or cloned early embryos.39 In fact, the human parthenote may be a tertium

quid, an organism that can give rise to stem cells but is incapable of matur
ing beyond an early stage because it is genetically programmed to die early
in its development. Consistent with her views on normal and cloned early
fertilized eggs, Kiessling champions the point: "Although parthenotes de
serve the respect afforded a cell as precious as an egg, they are not em
bryos and therefore debates about moral, ethical, or legal status should not
apply.'>4O
That opinion has, of course, been challenged.

Moreover, it makes

sense to say that Kiessling's enthusiasm for parthenotes is premature. To
my mind, current scientific data does not allow us to endorse Kiessling's
view, because

it

fails

to demonstrate

conclusively that the human

parthenote is not similar to a human ovasome.
Using chemicals that mimic a sperm's arrival, Kiessling and colleagues
were first to trigger parthenogenesis in human eggs.41 As reported, the
eggs activated were diploid: "The stimulus was applied before the egg un
derwent the normal ejection of half its chromosomes, which typically oc
curs at the time of fertilization to accommodate the sperm's DNA.'>42 This
is an important detail. It seems fair to ask what is the difference between a
3 6 /d.

37

38

George, supra note 31, at 296.
This view is consistent with my opposition to creating embryos for research purposes.

See

Quinn, supra note 9, at 860.

39 See,

e.g., Jose B. Cibelli et aI., The First Human Cloned Embryo, 256 SO. AM. 44 (2002) (re

porting the first successful induction of parthenogenesis in human eggs, although the resulting
parthenotes did not contain any stem cells). Author Kiessling is a major contributor here. See Jose B.
Cibelli, Ann A. Kiessling et al. Somatic Cell Nucleor Transfer in Humans: Pronuclear and Early
EmbryoniC Development, 2 J. REGENERATIVEMED. 25 (2001) (same).

40 Kiessling, supra note 2, at 1089.
4 1 See Cibelli et aI., supra note 39.
42 Rick Weiss, 'Parthenotes' Expand

the Debate on Stem Cells, WASH. POST, Dec. 10, 2001, at

All, available at LEXIS, News Library, Wpost File.
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parthenote and an ovasome if both present a case of the human genome.
For some scientists, the parthenote might be judged not human because its
"genomic imprinting" is wrong.43 I am not qualified to pronounce on that
claim but I do agree that parthenogenesis "really stretches the categories, if
it does not in fact break them down entirely" and so "demands much more
thought and research.'>44

In the face of ambiguity, the human parthenote

should be treated as ifit were a ovasome.
This commentary represents "a delicate juggling of public policy phi
,
losophy and theology, and scientific data'>45 and I hope "a reminder to all of
us of the importance of epistemic humility'>46 before the realities of the
natural world and the data of science. Let the dialogue continue.

43 See Nicholas Wade, New Stem Cell Source Called Possible, N.Y. nMES, Feb. 1,2002,at A23.
"Genomic imprinting" has been described as the differential expression of genetic material depending
on parental origin. See, e.g., IAN WllMUT ET AL., THE SECOND CREATION: DoLLY AND THE AGE OF
BIOLOGICAL CONTROL 127 (2000 ). In mammals, parental imprinting ensures the functional inequality
of paternal and maternal genomes in the fertilized egg, and causes developmental failure of embryos
produced by parthenogenesis. Id. at 127-28. In short, both male and female genomes must be present
to ensure that a fertilized egg has a possible future. Id.
44 Thomas A. Shannon, Human Cloning: A Success Story or a Tempest in a Petri Dish?,
AMERICA, Feb. 18,2002,at IS, 18.
45 John F. Kavanaugh, Debating Life, AMERICA, Mar. 22, 2004, at 25 (reviewing GOD AND THE
EMBRYO, supra note 28).
46
Farley, supra note 31, at D-4.
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